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Abstract—As the number of resources on chip multiprocessors (CMPs) increases, the complexity of how to best allocate these
resources increases drastically. Because the higher number of applications makes the interaction and impacts of various memory
levels more complex. Also, the selection of the objective function to define what “best” means for all applications is challenging.
Memory-level parallelism (MLP) aware replacement algorithms in CMPs try to maximize the overall system performance or equalize
each application’s performance degradation due to sharing. However, depending on the selected “performance” metric, these
algorithms are not efficiently implemented, because these centralized approaches mostly need some further information regarding
about applications’ need. In this paper, we propose a contention-aware game-theoretic resource management approach (CARMA)
using market auction mechanism to find an optimal strategy for each application in a resource competition game. The applications
learn through repeated interactions to choose their action on choosing the shared resources. Specifically, we consider two cases: (i)
cache competition game, and (ii) main processor and co-processor congestion game. We enforce costs for each resource and derive
bidding strategy. Accurate evaluation of the proposed approach show that our distributed allocation is scalable and outperforms the
static and traditional approaches.
Index Terms—Game Theory, Resource Allocation, Auction.
F
1 INTRODUCTION
THE number of cores on chip multiprocessors (CMP) isincreasing each year and it is believed that only many-
core architectures can handle the massive parallel applica-
tions. Server-side CMPs usually have more than 16 cores
and potentially more than hundreds of applications can run
on each server. These systems are going to be the future
generation of the multi-core processor servers. Applications
running on these systems share the same resources like
last level cache (LLC), interconnection network, memory
controllers, off-chip memories or co-processors where the
higher number of applications makes the interaction and
impacts of various resource levels more complex. Along
with the rapid growth of core integration, the performance
of applications highly depend on the allocation of the re-
sources and especially the contention for shared resources
[1–11]. In particular, as the number of co-runners running on
a shared resource increases, the magnitude of performance
degradation increases. Also, the selection of the objective
function to define what “best” means for all applications
is challenging or even theoretically impossible to improve
IPC of one application and memory latency of another
application simultaneously in a system. As a result, this new
architectural paradigm introduces several new challenges in
terms of scalability of resource management and assignment
on these large-scale servers. Therefore, a scalable compe-
tition method between applications to reach the optimal
assignment can significantly improve the performance of co-
runners on a shared resource. Figure 1 shows an example of
performance degradation for 10 spec 2006 applications when
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Fig. 1: Performance degradation of 10 different spec 2006
applications sharing LLC.
running on a shared 10MB LLC (Shared), or when running
on a private 1MB LLC (Separate).
Among these shared resources, sharing CPUs and LLCs
plays an important role in overall CMP utilization and
performance. Modern CMPs are moving towards hetero-
geneous architecture designs where one can get advantage
of both small number of high performance CPUs or higher
number of low performance cores. The advent Intel Xeon Phi
co-processors is an example of such heterogeneous architec-
tures that during run-time the programmer can decide to
run any part of the code on small number of Xeon processors
or higher number of Xeon Phi co-processors. Therefore, the
burden of making decisions on getting the shared resources
is moving towards the applications. In addition to the
shared CPUs, shared LLC keeps data on chip and reduces
off-chip communication costs [12]. Sometimes an applica-
tion may flood on a cache and occupy a large portion of
available memory and hurt performance of another appli-
cation which rarely loads on memory, but its accesses are
usually latency-sensitive. Recently, many proposals target
partitioning the cache space between applications such that
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2(1) each application gets the minimum required space, so
that per-application performance is guaranteed to be at an
acceptable level, (2) system performance is improved by
deciding how the remaining space should be allocated to
each one.
Prior schemes [3, 12–17] are marching towards these two
goals, usually by trading off the system complexity and
maximum system utilization. It is shown that neither a pure
private LLC, nor a pure shared LLC, can provide optimal
performance for different workloads [6]. In general, cache
partitioning techniques can be divided into way partitioning
and co-scheduling techniques. In a set-associative cache,
partitioning is done by per-way allocation. For example, in
a 4-way 512KB shared cache allocating 128KB to application
A means to allow it storing data blocks in only one way per-
set, without accessing remaining. Co-scheduling techniques
try to co-schedule a set of applications with lowest inter-
ference together at the same time such that the magnitude
of slow-down for each application is the same or a perfor-
mance metric is optimized for all applications. However,
it is shown that, depending on the objective function for
the performance metric, cache allocation can result in totally
different allocations [4]. In general Prior schemes have the
following three limitations:
1. Scalability: All of the prior schemes suffer from scala-
bility; especially when the approach is tracking the applica-
tion’s dynamism [3, 13, 17]. The reason is that algorithm
complexity becomes higher in dynamic approaches. The
root cause of this complexity is that all previous tech-
niques make decisions (cache partitioning, co-scheduling)
centralized using a central hardware or software. For ex-
ample, main algorithm of [13] has exponential complexity
O(
(
N+K−1
K−1
)
) whereN is the number of applications sharing
LLC and K is the number of ways. Table 1 shows the state
of the art cache partitioning algorithms and their complexity
of checking performance of different permutations.
2. Static-based: Most of the prior works, use static co-
scheduling to degrade slow-down of co-running applica-
tions on the same shared cache. However, static-based ap-
proaches cannot catch dynamic behavior of applications.
Figure 2 shows an example of two applications’ IPC (hmmer
and mcf ) from Spec 2006 under different LLC sizes. Let us
consider a case where we have two cache sizes, a large cache
of 1MB which can be shared between applications, and two
private caches of 512KB which are not shared. The two
applications are competing for the cache space. Suppose that
both applications have two phases (0, T ) and (T, 2T ). If the
first application gets the larger cache space its IPC increases
by 35 percent in the first phase and by 20.6 percent in the
second phase. The second application’s IPC increases by 15
percent in the first phase and by 36.84 percent in the second
phase if it gets the larger cache space. In a static-based
scheduling approach, the larger LLC is always allocated to
the first application with higher IPC in the time interval
(0, 2T ), but in CARMA, the applications compete for the
shared resources, and in the first phase, the larger LLC is
allocated to the first application and in the second phase
CARMA allocates the larger LLC to the second application.
Therefore, static-based approaches cannot capture the dy-
namism in application’s behavior and ultimately degrade
TABLE 1: Complexity comparison of state-of-the-art LLC
partitioning/co-scheduling algorithms.
Algorithm Search Space
Utility-based main algorithm [13]
(N+K−1
N−1
)
Greedy Co-scheduling [17]
N applications and N/K caches
(N
K
)
Hierarchical perfect matching [17]
N applications N
4
Local optimization [17]
N applications and N/K caches (N/K)
2(2K
K
)
CARMA
N applications and K resources O(NK)
the performance significantly.
3. Fairness: Defining a single parameter for fairness is
challenging for multiple applications, since applications
have different performance benefits from each resource dur-
ing each phase. In prior works fairness has been defined
as a unique metric (eg. IPC, Power, Weighted Speed-up)
for all applications. Therefore, in current approaches, the
optimization goal of algorithms is the same for all appli-
cations. Consequently, we cannot sum up applications that
desire different metrics in the same platform to decide on.
However, if one application needs better IPC and another
requires lower energy, the previous algorithms are not able
to model it. The only way to address diversity of metrics (to
be optimized) is to have an appropriate translation between
different metrics (eg. IPC to Power) that is not trivial, while
not addressed in prior study.
In this paper, we present a game-theoretic resource
assignment method to address all the above shortcomings
including scalability, dynamism and fairness, while applica-
tions can get their desired performance based on their utility
functions.
1. Semi-Decentralized: Dual of each centralized problem
is decentralized, if the optimization goal is broken into a
smaller meaningful sub-problems. In the context of hetero-
geneous resource assignment this is straightforward. The
profiling, analyzing and evaluating the demands are on
application side, but the final decision on assigning the
resources to applications based on the applications’ bids is
easily performed by the OS while they compete with each
other for the best assignment. Like a capitalist system, the
complexity of the governing transfers to the independent
entities, and the government just make the policies and the
final decisions. To achieve this, we introduce a novel market-
based approach. Roughly speaking, the complexity of our
approach in worst case scenario (for each application) is
O(NK) where N is the number of the applications and K
App1 27.8% App1 35%
App2 36.84%
Static approaches: 27.8% Improvement CARMA: (36.84/2+35/2)%>27.8%
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Fig. 2: Performance comparison of static and dynamic
scheduling of two applications (hmmer and mcf from Spec
2006) under two different LLC sizes.
3is the number of available resources. However, on average
the auction terminates in less than N/2 iterations.
2. Dynamic: In order to confront the scalability problem
of previous approaches, we use a market-based approach
to move the decision making to the individual applications.
Iterative auctions have been designed to solve non-trivial re-
source allocation problems with low complexity cost in gov-
ernment sale of resources, eBay, real estate sales and stock
market. Similarly, decentralized computation complexity is
lower than centralized (for each application) which provides
the opportunity to make the decision revisiting the allo-
cation in small time quantum, or when a new application
leaves or comes into the system.
3. Fair: The proposed method solves the heterogeneous
resource assignment problem in the context of marketing.
Applications’ demand regardless of the global optimization
objective (IPC, Power, etc.) translates to the true valuation of
their own performance. Resource assignment to the applica-
tions with the highest bids is performed by the auctioneer
(the OS); making it local optimization objectives. Hence,
resource assignment can be performed for different appli-
cations with different objectives known as utility functions.
Overall, the proposed approach for cache contention
game on average brings in 33.6% improvement in system
performance (when running 16 applications) compared to
shared LLC; while reaching less than 11.1% of the maximum
achievable performance in the best dynamic scheme. In the
case study of heterogeneous CPU assignment, it brings in
106.6% improvement (when running 16 applications at the
same time). Also, the performance improvement increases
even more as the number of co-running applications in-
creases in the system.
Other potentials: We introduce an auction-based resource
management approach for different applications in large-
scale competition games. In short, we as a system owner
pay for a high-end CMP system for servers and guarantee
that each application/user takes its best from the system by
paying us back, or we as an application owner bid/pay the
system to get the resources for my best performance. The
auctioneer is application-agnostic, and does not interfere
with applications’ profile to globally optimize the system,
but the applications compete for their own improvement.
The two case studies of cache partitioning and CPU shar-
ing are examples for resource sharing and the proposed
approach can be employed in other resource partitioning
algorithms.
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion 2 discusses the background and motivation behind
this work. In section 3, we discuss our auction-based game
model. Section 4 discusses the case study of cache con-
tention game and the case study of main processor and
co-processor contention and simulation results. Section 5
studies related works and Section 6 concludes the paper
with a summary.
2 MOTIVATION AND BACKGROUND
2.1 Motivation
Different applications have different resource constraint
with respect to CPU, memory, and bandwidth usage. Hav-
ing a single resource manager for all existing resources and
users in the system result in inefficiencies since it is not
scalable and the operating system may not have enough
information about applications’ needs. For example, tradi-
tional LRU-based cache strategy uses cache utilization as a
metric to give larger cache size to the applications which
have higher utilization and lower cache size to the appli-
cations with lower cache utilization. However more cache
utilization does not always result in better performance.
Streaming applications for example have very high cache
utilization, but very small cache reuse. In fact, the streaming
applications only need a small cache space to buffer the
streaming data. With rapid improvements in semiconductor
technology, more and more cores are being embedded into
a single core and managing large scale application using a
single resource manager becomes more challenging.
In addition, defining a single fairness parameter for multi-
ple applications is non-trivial since applications have differ-
ent bottlenecks and may get different performance benefits
from each resources during each phases of their execution
time. Defining a single reasonable parameter for fairness
is somewhat problematic. For instance, simple assignment
algorithms which try to equally distribute the resources be-
tween all applications ignores the fact that different applica-
tions have different resource constraints. As a consequence,
this makes the centralized resource management systems
very inefficient in terms of fairness as well as performance
needs of applications. We need a decentralized framework,
where all applications’ performance benefit could be trans-
lated into a unique notion of fairness and performance
objective (known as utility function in economics) and the
algorithm tries to allocate resources based on this translated
notion of fairness. This translation has been well defined
in economics and marketing, where the diversity of cus-
tomer needs, makes more economically efficient market [20].
Economists have shown that in an economically efficient
market, having diverse resource constraints and letting the
customers compete for the resources can make a Nash equi-
librium where both the applications and the resource man-
agers can be enriched. Furthermore, applications’ demand
changes over time. Most resource allocation schemes pre-
allocate the resources without considering the dynamism in
applications’ need and number of users sharing the same
resource over time. Therefore, applications’ performance
can degrade drastically over time. Figure 3 shows phase
transitions for instruction per cycle (IPC) of mcf application
from spec 2006 over 50 billion instructions.
We try to find a game-theoretic distributed resource man-
agement approach where the shared hardware resources are
exposed to the applications and we show that by running
a repeated auction game between different applications
which are assumed to be rational, the output of the game
converges to a balanced Nash equilibrium allocation. In
addition, we compare the convergence time of the proposed
algorithm in terms of dynamism in the system. We evaluate
our model with two case studies: 1) Private and shared
last level cache problem, where the applications have to
decide if they would benefit from a larger cache space
which can potentially get more congested or a smaller cache
space which is potentially less congested. 2) Heterogeneous
processors (Intel Xeon and Xeon Phi) problem, where we
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Fig. 3: Phase transition in mcf with different L2 cache sizes.
perform experiments to show how congestion affects the
performance of different applications running on an Intel
Xeon or Xeon Phi co-processors. Depending on the amount
of congestion in the system, the application can offload the
most time consuming part of its code on the Xeon Phi co-
processors or not.
2.2 Background
Game theory has been used extensively in economics,
political and social decision making situations [21–28]. A
game is a situation, where the output of each player not
only depends on her own action in the game, but also
on the action of other players [29]. Auction games are a
class of games which has been used to formulate real-world
problems of assigning different resources between n users.
Auction game framework can model resource competition,
where the payoff (cost) of each application in the system is
a function of the contention level (number of applications)
in the game.
Inspired by market-based interactions in real life games,
there exists a repeated interaction between competitors in a
resource sharing game. Assuming large number of applica-
tions, we show that the system gets to a Nash equilibrium
where all applications are happy with their resource assign-
ment and don’t want to change their state. Furthermore,
we show that the auction model is strategy-proof, such that
no application can get more utilization by bidding more or
less than the true value of the resource. In this paper we
propose a distributed market based approach to enforce cost
on each resource in the system and remove the complexity
of resource assignment from the central decision maker.
The traditional resource assignment is performed by
the operating system or a central hardware to assign fair
amount of resources to different applications. However, fair
scheduling is not always optimal and solving the optimiza-
tion problem of assigning m resources between n users in
the system is an integer programming which is an NP-hard
problem and finding the best assignment problem becomes
computationally infeasible. Prior works focus on designing
a fair scheduling function that maximizes all application’s
benefit [30–34], while applications might have completely
different demands and it is not possible to use the same
fairness function for all. By shifting decision making to the
individual applications, the system becomes scalable and
the burden of establishing fairness is removed from the
centralized decision maker, since individual applications
have to compete for the resources they need. Applications
start by profiling the utility function for each resource and
bid for the most profitable resource. During the course of
execution time they can update their belief based on the
observed performance metrics at each round of the auction.
Updating the utility functions at each round of the auction
is based on the history of the observed performance metrics
which shows the state of the game. This state indicates the
contention on the current acquired resources. The payoff
function in each round depends on the state of the system
and on the action of other applications in the system.
2.2.1 Sequential Auction
Auction-based algorithms are used for maximum
weighted perfect matching in a bipartite graph G =
(U, V,E) [35–37]. A vertex Ui ∈ U is the application in the
auction and a vertex Vj ∈ V is interpreted as a resource.
The weight of each edge from Ui to Vj shows the utility of
getting that particular resource by Ui. The prices are initially
set to zero and will be updated during each iteration of
the auction. In sequential auctions, each resource is taken
out by the auctioneer and is sequentially auctioned to the
applications, until all the resources are sold out.
2.2.2 Parallel Auction
In a parallel auction, the applications submit their bids
for the first most profitable item. The value of the bid at
each iteration is computed based on the difference of the
highest profitable object and the second highest profitable
object. The auctioneer would assign the resources based on
the current bids. At each iteration, the valuation of each
resource is updated based on the observed information dur-
ing run-time which shows the contention on that particular
resource.
3 THE METHOD
Consider n applications and i instances of m different re-
sources. Applications arrive in the system one at a time. The
applications have to choose amongm resources. There exists
a bipartite graph between the matching of the applications
and the resources.
In general, there can be more than one application to get
a shared resource. However, each application cannot get
more than one of the available heterogeneous resources. For
example, if we have two cache spaces of size 128kB (one
way) and 256kB (two ways), each application can either get
the 128kB, or the 256kB cache space and can’t get both of
them at the same time. Furthermore, each resource Rk has
a cost pk which is defined by the applications’ bid in the
auction.
Figure 4 shows our auction-based framework to sup-
port CARMA between N applications that execute together
competing for M different resources. Each application has
a utility table that shows how much performance it gets
from each M resources at each time slot. Based on the
utility tables, applications submit bids for the most prof-
itable resource. Based on the submitted bids, the auctioneer
decides about the resource assignment for each resource,
5TABLE 2: Notation used in our formulations.
N Number of players or applications (from App1 to
AppN ).
M Number of resources (from R1 to RM ).
~m A positive M × 1 vector in the resource space that
shows how much each application gets from each
resource.
T Time intervals where the bidding is held
ti,j j-th phase time for i-th application during its course
of execution time.
Ti Last phase time for application i.
vi(t, ~m) The valuation function of application i for the re-
source assignment ~m at time t.
vi,j(t, ~m, r) The valuation function of (application i,resource j), if
we replace the j-th resource in the resource vector m
by r
δ dynamic factor that shows how much we can rely on
the past iterations.
G = (U, V,E) A bipartite graph showing the resource allocation
between the applications and the set of resources.
U The set of applications which shows the left set of
nodes in the bipartite graph G = (U, V,E).
V The set of resources which shows the right set of
nodes in the bipartite graph G = (U, V,E).
E The edges in the bipartite graph.
bi,k User i’s bid for k-th resource.
Fi The total budget (summation of bids) a user have.
Ck The total capacity of each resource.
pk The price of resource k ∈ V in the auction.
K Number of cache levels
and updates the prices. Next, the applications who did not
get any assignment compete for the next most profitable
resource based on the updated prices repeatedly until all
applications are assigned. Figure 4 shows an example of a
resource assignment and the corresponding bipartite graph.
3.1 Problem Defenition
We formulate our problem as an auction to enforce
cost/value updates for each resource as follows:
• Valuation vi(t, m˜): Application i has a valuation
function which shows how much it benefits from the
resource vector ~m at time t. The valuation function
at time t = 0 for cache contention case study is
derived from the IPC (instruction per cycle) curves
using profiling, and for processor and co-processor
contention case study is derived from the profiling
of separate cache performance of the application.
However, in general, each application can choose its
own utility function.
• Observed information: The observed information
at each time step is the performance value of the
selected action in the game. Therefore, the applica-
tions repeatedly update the history of their valuation
function over time.
• Belief updating: Let T be the time intervals where
the bidding is held. At each iteration step of the
auction, the applications update their valuation of
each resource based on the observed performance on
the resource vector. The update at time W is derived
using the following formula:
vi(W, ~m) =
∑
0≤n≤W/T
δW/T−n · vi(nT, ~m)∑
0≤n≤W/T
δW/T−n
, (1)
where vi(W, ~m) shows the observed valuation of
resource vector ~m at time W by application i in
the system; δ shows the discount factor between
0 and 1 which shows how much a user relies on
its past observations in the system. The discount
factor is chosen to show the dynamics of the system.
If the observed information in the system changes
fast, the discount factor is close to zero, i.e. the
application cannot rely on the past observations
very much. However, if the system is more stable
and the observed information does not change fast,
the discount factor is closer to 1. If a user fails in
an auction, its payoff and corresponding observed
valuation at the current time is equal to zero. So,
it won’t probably bid for the same resource vector
again, since its valuation decreases for next round.
We choose the discount factor to be the absolute
value of the correlation coefficient of the observed
values of the valuations at each iteration step which
is calculated as follows:
δ =
E(vi(W, ~m))
2
σvi(W,~m)
2
(2)
• Action: At each time step, the applications decide
which resource to bid and how much to bid for each
resource.
Table 2 shows important notation used throughout the
paper. In the following sections, we describe our distributed
optimization scheme to solve the problem.
3.2 Distributed Optimization Scheme
The goal is to design a repeated auction mechanism which
runs by the operating system to guide the applications to
choose their best resource allocation strategy. The applica-
tions’ goal is to maximize their own performance and the
operating system wants to maximize the total utility gain
from the applications. Each application can use its own
utility function and evaluates the resources based on the
desired value of the resources.
Applications’ approach: The application i wants to max-
imize the expected utility (pay-off) with respect to a limited
budget (Fi) during all phases of its execution time. We have:
∀i ∈ U maximize
∑
0<t<Ti
vi(t, ~m)− bi(t, ~m),
subject to
∑
0<t<Ti
bi(t, ~m) ≤ Fi, ∀i ∈ U. (3)
OS’s approach: The operating system wants to maxi-
mize the social welfare function which is translated into
submitted bids from the applications in a limited resource
constraints.
maximize
N∑
i=1
∑
0<t<Ti
bi(t, ~m) ·Ai(t, ~m),
subject to
N∑
i=1
Ai(t, ~m) ≤ Amax, ∀t : 0 ≤ t ≤ T,
Ai(t, ~m) ∈ {0, 1}, ∀i ∈ U, ∀~m ⊆ V, ∀t : 0 ≤ t ≤ T, (4)
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Fig. 4: Framework for auction-based resource assignment (CARMA).
where the binary variable Ai(t, ~m) represents the decision
to assign resource vector ~m to application i at time t (when
Ai(t, ~m) = 1) or not (when Ai(t, ~m) = 0); and V is the
vector space of the all resource vectors (∀~m); and Amax
shows the maximum number of the applications which can
share the resource vector ~m.
Illustrative example: As an illustrative example shown in
Figure 2, let us consider a case where we have two differ-
ent resources, a large cache of 1MB which can be shared
between applications, and two private caches of 512KB
which are not shared. The first application participates in
the auctions with 35 bid at the first phase and 21 bid at
the next phase. The second application participates in the
auctions with 15 bid at the first phase and 37 bid at the next
phase. The auctioneer (OS) decides to allocate larger cache
in the auctions at first phase to the first application and at
next phase to the second application.
3.3 Analysis
The distributed optimization problem is hard to solve.
However, in reality, the problem can split into simpler
subproblems since each application knows its bottleneck
resource and would first bid for the first bottleneck resource
to maximize its utility.
We suppose all applications in the system are risk-neutral
which means they have a linear valuation of the utility
function. Each risk-neutral agent wants to maximize its
expected revenue. Risk attitude behaviors are defined in
[38] where the agents can broadly be divided into risk-
averse, risk-seeking and risk neutral. Risk-averse agents
prefer deterministic values rather than risky value profits
and risk-seeking applications have a super-linear utility
function and prefer risky utilities than sure utilities. Next,
we derive the Bayes Nash equilibrium strategy profile for
all agents in the system assuming risk neutrality.
Definition 1. A strategy profile a is a pure Nash equilibrium
if for every application i and every strategy a′i 6= ai ∈ A
we have ui(ai, a−i) ≥ ui(a′i, a−i)
Theorem 1. Suppose n risk-neutral applications whose
valuations are derived uniformly and independently from
the interval [0, 1] compete for one resource which can be
assigned to m applications who have the highest bid in
the auction. We will show that Bayes Nash equilibrium
bidding strategy for each application in the system is to
bid n−mn−m+1vi where vi is the profit of application i for
getting the specified resource.
Theorem 1, states that whenever there is a single resource
that users compete to get it with different valuation func-
tions, the Nash equilibrium strategy profile for risk-neutral
users is to bid n−mn−m+1vi. This term tends to the true value of
the object when n is a large number.
In case of more than one resource competition we derive
Algorithm 1 for heterogeneous resource assignment and
will prove that it has a Nash equilibrium in the game.
Algorithm 1 uses Algorithm 2 to do budget planning for our
purpose. In the first step, all valuations are set to the solo-
run of application’s performance. Next, each application
submits a partial bid for its first bottleneck resource. The
partial bid should be larger than the price of the object which
is initialized to zero at the beginning of the program. The
applications only have the incentive to bid a value that is
no more than the difference between the first and second
bottleneck resource. Otherwise, it submits a smaller bid to
the second bottleneck and gets the same revenue as paying
more for the first bottleneck resource. In order to break the
equal valuation function between two different applications,
we use  scaling such that at each iteration of the auction
the prices should increase by a small number. The OS will
set the resources’ price with these partial bids, and find the
minimum of the highest partial bids for each resource. The
applications recurse for all the resources, and the total bid
is the summation of the partial bids for each application.
Then, the applications execute Algorithm 2 to participate in
the auction or not. Finally the participated applications with
7Algorithm 1: Parallel Auction for Heterogeneous Re-
source Assignment
Input: A bipartite Graph (U, V, E).
Output: The allocation of resources to applications.
1 The initial resource vector for each application is the
average amount across various resources. At time
t = nT , the valuation of each application for each
resource vector is updated using Eq. 1.
2 For application Ui ∈ U , the first bottleneck resource is
Vi,jmax1 = max1≤j1≤M
∆vi,j1(t, ~m, rj1)− pj1
where the differential valuation function is
∆vi,j(t, ~m, rj) = vi,j(t, ~m, rj)− vi(t, ~m).
3 Find the second bottleneck resource for application
Ui ∈ U in the system:
Vi,jmax2 = max1≤j2≤M ;j2 6=j1
∆vi,j2(t, ~m, rj2)− pj2
4 Each application calculates the partial bid for its first
bottleneck resource using the following formula:
bi,jmax1 (t) = Vi,jmax1 − Vi,jmax2 + pjmax1 + 
5 Each resource rj ∈ V which can be shared between L
applications, is assigned to the L highest bidding
applications Winneri,j = {i1, i2, ..., iL} and the price
for that resource is updated as follows:
pj = max
l∈{1,...,L}
bil,j
6 The minBid for each resource is updated as the
minimum bid of l applications who acquired j-th
resource. That is:
Bminj = min
il∈Winneri,j
bil,j
7 Goto step 2 until all partial bids for all resources are
determined.
8 The total bid of the application i is as follows:
bi(t, ~m) = bi(t, [rj1 ; rj2 ; ...; rjM ]) =
M∑
j=1
bi,j(t)
where iteratively ~m = [rj1 ; rj2 ; ...; rjM ].
9 Find the estimated investment Ii(t) using Algorithm 2
to plan the upper bound of the investment with
respect to the budget Fi. If Ii(t) ≥ bi(t, ~m), application
i will participate in this auction at time t, otherwise it
quits and other applications do the steps 2 and 3.
the bids higher than Bminj will get j-th resource.
The overhead of the auction for the auctioneer (the OS)
is very negligible. The OS during the auction only sets the
prices of the resources based on the received bids from the
applications and gives the resources to the highest bids. So
every T seconds, the OS runs these two jobs, which adds
a negligible overhead with respect to other tasks of the OS.
Our approach also satisfies the following properties: 1) Indi-
vidual rationality (IR): Applications’ expected utility is non-
negative because the amount of the bid cannot be beyond
Algorithm 2: Budget Planning
Input: A bipartite Graph (U, V, E).
Output: Participation (YES) in an auction or Quit (NO).
1 At time t = nT , assume that we have the same state in
terms of resources.
2 For application Ui ∈ U , we similarly run the steps 2, 3,
4, 5 and 6 of Algorithm 1 to find all estimated bids in
next rounds based on its various phases. We have:
bi(ti,j , ~m) =
M∑
j=1
bi,j(t);∀ti,j > t
Also, we have the previous bids of the application i:
bi(ti,j , ~m);∀ti,j < t
3 If Fi ≥
∑
∀ti,j 6=t
bi(ti,j , ~m), then YES and the application
will participate in the auction. Otherwise NO, and the
application will update the zero valuation for current
round using Eq. 1.
the sum of the difference of the valuations which is at most
the highest valuation of the application. 2) Truthfulness:
Applications cannot benefit from bidding other than their
true valuation. By contradiction, if an application bids lower
than the true value, there may be another application with a
higher bid to take the resource. But we cannot guarantee the
truthfulness in the case of collusion among applications. 3)
Budget-balance: The whole payments from the applications
are less than the OS revenue, which is trivial as we have
only one seller which is the OS. 4) Economic efficiency: It
has been shown in [35] that this assignment is optimal, but
it doesn’t mean it is economically efficient since we know
that it depends on the applications’ valuation which is sub-
optimal.
4 CASE STUDIES
4.1 CPU Scale-up Scale-out Game
The emerging high-performance computing applications
lead to the advent of Intel Xeon Phi co-processor, that when
their highly parallel architecture is fully utilized, can run
in order of magnitude more performance than the existing
processor architectures. The Xeon Phi co-processors are the
first commercial product of Intel MIC processors where
the hardware architecture is exposed to the programmer
to choose running the code on either Xeon processor or
Xeon Phi co-processors. It is possible that, during the course
of execution, either the processor or the co-processor get
congested and the performance of the application degrades
a lot. Therefore, making a decision to offload the most
time-consuming part of the program on Xeon or Xeon Phi
should be made online, based on the contention level. In
this section, we look at the case study of our auction-based
model on decision making of running the application on the
main or co-processor in a highly congested environment.
The experimental results of this section are run on Stam-
pede cluster of Texas Advanced Computing Center. Table 3
8TABLE 3: The comparison of Intel Xeon processor and Intel
Xeon Phi processor.
Processors Xeon E5-2680 Xeon Phi SE10P
Cores/Sockets 8/2 61/1
Clock Frequency 2.7 GHz 1.1 GHz
Memory 32GB 8x4G 4-
channels DDR3-
1600MHz
8GB GDDR5
L1 cache 32 KB 32 KB
L2 cache 256 KB 512 KB
L3 cache 20 MB -
shows the comparison of Intel Xeon and Xeon Phi architec-
tures which is used in this section. It is observed that conges-
tion has a significant impact on the performance of running
the application on Xeon and Xeon Phi machines. Since most
cloud computing machines are shared between thousands
of users, the programmer not only should get the benefit
of parallelism by offloading the most time-consuming part
of the code to the larger number of low-performance cores
(Xeon Phi) but also should consider the congestion level
(number of co-runners) in the system. To this end, we
performed experiments on Stampede clusters. We executed
MiniGhost application which is a part of Mantevo project [39]
which uses difference stencils to solve partial differential
equations using numerical methods. The applications use
the profiling utility functions at t = 0 and during the
course of execution update the utility function based on the
observed performance on each core using Equation 1. Then,
they can revisit their previous action on running the code
on either the processor or co-processor during run-time.
Figure 5 shows the total execution time with respect to
congestion we made in Xeon and Xeon Phi. In this exper-
iment we ran the same problem size on a Xeon and Xeon
Phi machine multiple times so that we could see the effect
of load on the total execution time of our application. It
was observed that with the same number of threads Xeon’s
performance degrades more than Xeon phi. Next, we tried
to change the application behavior using a congestion-
aware game theoretic algorithm to offload the most time-
consuming part of the application based on the performance
behavior of applications. Figure 6 shows the result of our
game-theoretic model during the execution time. It is ob-
served that during the course of execution, the applications
change their strategy on either choosing the main proces-
sor or the co-processor and all applications’ performance
converge to an equilibrium point where applications don’t
want to change their strategy.
Furthermore, it is shown that CARMA can bring in up to
106.6% improvement in total execution time of applications
compared to static approach when the number of co-runners
is six. The performance improvement would be significant
when the number of co-runners increase. Figure 7 shows the
performance comparison of CARMA and static approach
which does not consider the congestion dynamism in the
system and the decision is only made based on the paral-
lelism level in the code.
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4.2 A Case Study of Private and shared cache game
One of the challenging problems in CMP resource
management systems is whether applications benefit from
a shared large last level cache or an isolated private cache.
We evaluated CARMA’s performance, on a 10MB LLC
shown in Figure 8, where 2MB, 1MB, 512kB, 256kB and
128kB levels of LLC can potentially be shared between 16,
8, 4, 2 and 1 applications respectively, the cache levels have
16, 8, 4, 2, and 1 ways. Table 5 summarizes the studies
workloads and their characteristics, including miss per
kilo instructions (MPKI), memory bandwidth usage, and
IPC. We use applications from Spec 2006 benchmark suite
[40]. We use Gem5 full system simulator in our experiment
[41, 42]. Table 4 shows the experimental setup in our
experiments.
To evaluate the performance of our proposed approach
we use utility functions for different number of cache ways
shown in Figure 9. These utility functions at the start of the
execution can be found using either profiling techniques or
stack distance profile [5, 43, 44] of applications assuming
there are no co-runners in the system. Next, during run-
time, the applications can update their utility functions
9128 K 128 K 128 K 128 K 128 K 128 K 128 K 128 K 128 K 128 K 128 K 128 K 128 K 128 K 128 K 128 K
256 k256 k256 k256 k256 k256 k256 k256 k
512 k512 k512 k512 k
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Fig. 8: The proposed last level cache hierarchy model.
TABLE 4: Experimental Setup.
Processors Single threaded with private
L1 instruction and data caches
Frequency 1GHz
L1 Private ICache 32 kB, 64-byte lines, 4-way as-
sociative
L1 Private DCache 32 kB, 64-byte lines, 4-way as-
sociative
L2 Shared Cache 128 kb-2 MB, 64-byte lines, 16-
way associative
RAM 12 GB
TABLE 5: Evaluated workloads.
# Benchmark MPKI Memory BW IPC
1 astar 1.319 373 MB/s 2.057
2 bwaves 10.47 1715 MB/s 0.661
3 bzip2 3.557 1194 MB/s 1.367
4 dealII 0.935 307 MB/s 2.107
5 GemsFDTD 0.004 2.19 MB/s 2.023
6 hmmer 2.113 1547 MB/s 2.861
7 lbm 19.287 3954 MB/s 0.533
8 leslie3d 8.469 1942 MB/s 1.297
9 libquantum 10.388 1589 MB/s 0.531
10 mcf 16.93 820 MB/s 0.073
11 namd 0.051 20.32 MB/s 2.362
12 omnetpp 10.34 1147 MB/s 0.504
13 sjeng 0.375 139.2 MB/s 1.403
14 soplex 4.672 390.8 MB/s 0.513
15 sphinx3 0.349 202.8 MB/s 2.223
16 streamL 31.682 3619 MB/s 0.581
17 tonto 0.260 107 MB/s 2.036
18 xalancbmk 12.703 1200 MB/s 0.558
based on Equation 1. Therefore, there is a learning phase
where applications learn about the state of the system and
update the utilities accordingly. The stack distance profile
indicates how many more cache misses will be added if the
application has less number of ways in the cache. Based
on the stack distance profile, the applications can update
their utility function and bid for the next iteration of the
auction if they like to change their allocation. Next, we
bring an example of the auction for one time step of the
game. This time step can be repeated once an application
arrives or leaves the system or when an application’s
phase changes during run-time. However, in case of one
application’s phase change or arriving or leaving the
system, the algorithm reaches the optimal assignment in
much fewer iterations since all other assignments are fixed
and a few applications would be affected.
Example: As an example, suppose we have 5 different
applications and 5 different cache levels with different
capacities of 128KB, 256KB, 512KB, 1MB and 2MB. In
addition, suppose the 128kB cache level can not accomodate
more than one application and 256kB cache can accomodate
2 applications, 512kB level can have 4 applications, 1MB
cache can have 8 applications and 2MB cache can have at
most 16 applications. Let’s assume the following matrix be
the utility function of each application on each cache level.
Some applications may get better utility from smaller
cache space since they are less congested and since these
applications have low data locality, moving to larger cache
spaces not only does not increase their performance but also
degrades the performance by evicting other applications
from the cache and making contention on the memory
bandwidth which is a more vital resource for them 1.
M =

1way 2way 4way 8way 16way
App1 1.9 1.7 1.5 1 0.9
App2 1.6 1.3 1.1 0.8 0.7
App3 1.4 1.0 0.6 0.5 0.4
App4 0.3 0.6 0.9 1.2 1.4
App5 0.7 0.8 1.1 1.4 1.7
 (5)
In the first iteration of the bidding, the first 3 applications
bid for the most profitable resource which is 128kB cache
and they submit a bid equal to the difference of profit
between the first and the second most profitable resource.
Therefore, the first application, submits 0.2 bid to 128kb
and the second application submits 0.3 and the third ap-
plication submits 0.4. Since only one of the players can
acquire the 128kB cache space, the first application will
get it. The 4th and 5th application compete for 2MB cache
space and they both get it with the sum bid of both which
is 0.5. In the next round, the prices will be updated and
since applications 2 and 3 don’t have any cache assignment
compete for the 256kB cache space and each bid 0.2 which
is the difference between 1.7 and 1.5 and 1.3 and 1.1 in
the performance matrix accordingly. Since the second level
cache can accommodate both applications the price will be
updated and the minimum bidding price for someone to
get this cache level is updated to the minimum bid of both
which is 0.2. Therefore, if some application bid more than
0.2 it can acquire the resource and the application with the
smallest bid has to resubmit the bid to acquire the resource.
Figure 10a, 10b, and 10c show the bidding steps and the
prices and minimum price of bidding accordingly. As seen
from the figures, the auction terminates in three iterations
when there exist five applications.
4.3 A Case Study for Hybrid Cache Game
In hybrid cache game, each cache partition can have a
cluster of applications. We use different mixes of 4 to 16
applications from Spec 2006 to evaluate the performance of
our proposed approach compared to others. To evaluate
our approach, we selected the state-of-the-art centralized
cache partitioner [? ] (KPart) as a competitor which aims
at maximizing the global IPC speedup. CARMA uses multi-
resource valuations, so each application can have any cri-
teria to maximize its payoff. In order to provide a fair
comparison with our approach, we use IPC speedup as the
1. libquantum, streamL, sphinx3, lbm and mcf are examples of such
applications.
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Fig. 10: Cache allocation, a) first round, b) second round and c) third round of bidding.
optimization goal for all applications.
Figure 11 shows the normalized throughput of 10 differ-
ent mix of applications [? ], using CARMA, KPart [? ], equal
separate cache partitioning and completely shared cache
space after convergence. Furthermore, Figure 12 shows the
scalability of our proposed algorithm. When the number of
co-runners increases from 2 to 16, the performance improves
without any need to track each applications’ performance
in a central module. Having full information about appli-
cations’ profiles, CARMA outperforms the other centralized
competitors, when the number of the applications increases.
Since KPart is a centralized (not an auction-based) ap-
proach, we assume that it has an unlimited budget. The
budget matters in CARMA. We setup another experiment to
track the variations of the normalized throughput versus the
normalized budget for a mix of 16 applications. Figure 13
shows that the throughput of CARMA, is very sensitive to
the budget. The throughput changes dramatically at some
inflection point, and at the end it is saturated but higher
than KPart.
5 RELATED WORK
With rapid improvement in computer technology, more
and more cores are embedded in a single chip and ap-
plications competing for a shared resource is becoming
common. On the one hand, managing scheduling of shared
resources for a large number of applications is challenging
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in a sense that the operating system doesn’t know what
is the performance metric for each application. But on the
other hand, the operating system has a global view of the
whole state of the system and can guide applications on
choosing the shared resources.
There have been several works, for managing the shared
cache in multi-core systems. Qureshi et al. [13] showed that
assigning more cache space to applications with more cache
utility does not always lead to better performance since
there exist applications with very low cache reuse which
may have very high cache utilization.
Several software and hardware approaches have been
proposed to find the optimal partitioning of cache space
for different applications [3]. However, most of these ap-
proaches use brute force search of all possible combinations
to find the best cache partitioning in runtime or introduce
a lot of overhead. There have been some approaches which
use binary search to reduce searching all possible combina-
tions [5, 14, 45]. But none of these methods are scalable for
the future many-core processor designs.
There exists prior game-theoretic approaches designing
a centralized scheduling framework that aims at a fair
optimization of applications’ utility [30–34]. Zahedi et al. in
REF [30, 33] use the Cobb-Douglas production function as a
fair allocator for cache and memory bandwidth. They show
that the Cobb-Douglas function provides game-theoretic
properties such as sharing incentives, envy-freedom, and
Pareto efficiency. But their approach is still centralized and
spatially divides the shared resources to enforce a fair
near-optimal policy sacrificing the performance. In their
approach, the centralized scheduler assumes all applications
have the same priority for cache and memory bandwidth,
while we do not have any assumption on this. Further,
our auction-based resource allocation can be used for any
number of resources and any priority for each application
and the centralized scheduler does not need to have a global
knowledge of these priorities.
Ghodsi et al. in DRF [32] use another centralized fair
policy to maximize the dominant resource utilization. But
in practice, it is not possible to clone any number of
instances of each resource. Cooper [31] enhances REF to
capture colocated applications fairly, but it only addresses
the special case of having two sets of applications with
matched resources. Fan et al. [34] exploits computational
sprinting architecture to improve task throughput assuming
a class of applications where boosting their performance by
increasing the power.
While all prior works use a centralized scheduling that
provides fairness and assumes the same utility function for
all, co-runners might have completely diverse needs and it
is not efficient to use the same fairness/performance policy
across them. Our auction-based resource scheduling pro-
vides scalability since individual applications compete for
the shared resources based on their utility and the burden
of decision making is removed from the central scheduler.
We believe that future CMPs should move toward a more
decentralized approach which is more scalable and provides
a fair allocation of resources based on the applications’
needs.
Auction theory which is a subfield of economics has
recently been used as a tool to solve large-scale resource
assignment in cloud computing [46, 47]. In an auction
process, the buyers submit bids to get the commodities and
sellers want to sell their commodities with the maximum
price as possible. Also auction-based allocators [? ? ] are
multi-buyers with multi-seller but there is only one resource
to bid. So, they cannot be used for our purpose, since
we have only one seller with multiple bundled resources.
That is why we choose a simpler related scheme for a
computer architecture to get higher performance with lower
transactions and auctions.
Our auction-based algorithm is inspired by work of Bert-
sekas [35] that uses an auction-based approach for network
flow problems. Our algorithm is an extension of local as-
signment problem proposed by Bertsekas et al. that has been
shown to converge to the global assignment within a linear
approximation.
12
6 CONCLUSION
This paper proposes a distributed resource allocation
approach for large-scale servers. The traditional resource
management system is not scalable, especially when track-
ing the application’s dynamic behavior. The main cause of
this complexity is the centralized decision making which
leads to higher time and space complexity. With increas-
ing number of cores per chip, the scalability of assigning
different resources to different applications becomes more
challenging in future generation CMP systems. In addition,
diversity in application’s need makes a single objective
function inefficient to get an optimal and fair performance
metric. We introduce a framework to map the allocation
problem to the known auction economy model where the
applications compete for the shared resources based on their
utility metrics of interest.
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